Informal trade is difficult to measure, because even if everyone has seen it, there is no evidence of it in official statistics. Thus, estimates are often difficult to arrive at and quite costly, as they require the collection of data from several sources, including customs data, data from border surveys, local economic and social statistics and interviews with actors and stakeholders in the sectors concerned.
However, such efforts appear to be bearing fruit: as information and data production improves, a number of assertions based on rumours, or even beliefs, are contradicted by actual figures. It is especially interesting to note that the phenomena and characteristics of informal trade are the same, whether in central Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa.
This subject is now even more important as informal trade appears to have taken on greater significance. It is important because, while it creates revenue losses for developing countries, it also contributes to local development – often in border regions far removed from major economic centres.
It is, therefore, time to shatter a number of myths about informal trade based on recent statistical studies.
One often has an image of the merchant who earns a living from informal trade by crossing the border by car or on foot with fruit and vegetables. It is true that, in that case, the revenue generated for these smugglers is often barely above the poverty line.
But for those who own cargo, informal trade is extremely profitable. With operating margins over 50pc, billions of profits are shared among the networks’ leaders, and this is also happening in Africa and central Asia. This, therefore, allows persons financing informal trade to become politicians and to enjoy a degree of impunity.
The authorities, customs in particular, often perceive informal trade as a whole. However, on detailed examination of informal trade practices, one notes that informal trade reproduces essentially the identical continuum of practices as formal trade.
Thus, some importers can be considered to be “professionals”, that is, paying virtually all customs duties or being subject to the same levels of taxation as formal importers. On the other end of the spectrum, there are importers who simply rely on personal relationships with customs officers and make deals by negotiating taxation levels that are very low or pay no taxes at all.
It is true that given the relatively low volumes of informal imports, informal trade can hardly explain the problems associated with customs revenue in developing countries. Nevertheless, proportionately, as it is often subject to tariff peaks or excise taxes, this trade could potentially earn a sizeable share of revenue.
The authorities often explain that smuggling results from a lack of equipment and materials at the border, and therefore wish to have scanners and cameras, and even go as far as asking for the placement of landmines at the border or the installation of barbed-wire fences, as is the case in the Fergana Valley in central Asia. But there has been little success in controlling informal trade.
When prices differ by a factor of three to four at a minimum, the informal importer always finds obliging customs or security officials through the payment of bribes. Thus, despite the existence of barbed-wire fences and cameras at the border, the flow continues to thrive as a result of the collaboration of a number of local oversight authorities.
One often mistakenly believes that it is the importers who control informal trade, but this is not the case. It is, first and foremost, the customs agents who are responsible for customs clearance, who pull the strings, because they are the ones who know the procedures (or not) and conducts them on behalf of the importer.
What can be done about it, though?
It is important to have an even better understanding of the practices of informal trade and generate information about them, because there are practices that are specific to some business sectors, which are often explained by the level of profit and the level of taxation. It is important that customs and security services make a much greater distinction between the treatment of importers and agents.
However, to accomplish that, it is crucial that these officials try to better understand and become more familiar with them. When possible, it is useful to try to identify the networks’ leaders, who pose a threat to the integrity of the institutions and grow rich at the expense of consumers. Not least, it is necessary to strengthen hierarchical oversight within institutions such as customs.
Thus, neither non-interference nor indiscriminate repression is in any way the solution. But, in challenging political contexts, this is often easier said than done.
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