In one of the televised debates in the run-up to the national election in 2005, Bereket Simon, the-then Minister of Information (MoI) and now head of the Government Communications Affairs Office (GCAO) with a ministerial portfolio, cornered opposition politicians by asking them whether they would concede that the downfall of the Dergue regime was a necessary and positive achievement. They had to resort to all sorts of arguments to avoid a bold response in the affirmative or negative.
Bereket’s inquiry was not a historical curiosity, rather it was intended to trap them into either giving credit to the ruling EPRDF or provide another evidence for its allegation that they are “remnants and sympathisers of the previous regime”. This allegation is often backed by the fact that most prominent opposition figures held offices in the previous regime or at least share some of its right-wing policies. But there was more to it.
Bereket’s party routinely criticises its oppositions of “opposing for the sake of opposing”. The fact that the oppositions downplay the nation’s socio-economic stride is often cited as evidence. Their failure to endorse policy measures considered as stances of national interest is accounted as addition.
The EPRDF heavily capitalises on this failure to an extent that any objection from the opposition is seen with a grain of doubt and thereby affecting the leverage of even legitimate points.
It is understandable that opposition parties would wish to be consulted before crucial governmental decisions are endorsed. After all, they are vying to take the top post and they would rather not help the EPRDF without getting some concessions. Though they failed to reciprocate the gesture extended to them on the eve of Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia, they were not given as many similar opportunities.
The best and more genuine defense in their favor, however, appears in discussions with Western activists. Citing how the major parties in their home countries act, they argue that it is natural for opposition parties to be opportunists.
This is to say that the oppositions would often take positions for the sake of discrediting the incumbent and promote themselves. There are several limits with such analogy, however.
In Western countries, there are some predictable limits to the position that a mainstream party might take. In Ethiopia, however, one can find a party that retreats classical liberalism and implicitly endorses neo-liberal stances, such as objecting private commercial farming leases and staying reluctant on the nation’s accession to the World Trade Organsiation (WTO). It would not be surprising if one finds the same party recommending tariff barriers and subsidies.
Indeed, the opposition parties hardly apply ideological yardstick in their recruitment and promotion of members. As one opposition figure put it, in a private discussion, they “would rather not discriminate based on abstract issues, as long as one believes in her Ethiopianism”.
In other words, what a member is expected to have is a sentiment that “EPRDF is destroying the country”. It is, thus, no surprise that we can find – current and former – leaders of “liberal democrat” parties saying “personally, they prefer socialism”.
The ruling party, too, shares some of such inconsistencies, although it disguises them with public relations works, members training and its model of “democratic centralism”. However, they are more damaging for the opposition that needs to build and mobilise a coherent political base that can remain intact, regardless of the challenges, and even outlive the disbandment of a party.
The untamed use of the license to be opportunists by the oppositions has broader implications. Certainly, it reinforces the natural inclination of the ruling party to make use of its “incumbency advantages” exhaustively. Indeed, the EPRDF does not need a reminder to build its political base through (and alongside) its governmental works. But in the presence of unreliable opposition groupings, it is hardly impossible to convince it otherwise.
The 2005 election is remembered amongst the EPRDFites as a time when they were tricked; the opposition misused the moment to bring mayhem. It does not matter whether that is accurate; what matters is their feeling. This seems to be why they exhausted all administrative and legal means to expand their influence and entrench their control.
One can preach the EPRDF, all day long, that democracy would be better off, if it refrains from making maximum use of its “incumbency advantages”. To be convincing, however, she needs to be able to demonstrate that the opposition would not do the same, if they get the chance. Westerners often fail to notice that they have little credibility in advising the EPRDF to embrace the possibility of a color revolution, given that they were seen silent or supportive of the disbandment of former ruling parties in Egypt and Tunisia for fear that they might win elections.
Perhaps, the most worrisome negative impact of this episode falls on the national political culture and institutions, which are at their infant stages.
The political discourse in the country is polarised to a point where nothing can be considered non-partisan or a matter of common interest. Debates often revolve on general policy matters and rarely go to the details.
Opposition political parties decline to dwell on the details, not only because it is painstaking, but also for fear that it would amount to recognising the incumbent regime. The EPRDF does not seem to hate that as it saves it. It leaves the execution process aloof from sustained public discourse and scrutiny.
Despite what leaders of the ruling party may claim, they are enjoying an opposition that makes a vague categorical demand for “the independence of the police”, rather than an opposition that brings to light how much the criminal procedure reform is lagging or campaigns for a law that provides compensation for police misconducts.
The polarisation also undermines the possibility that mediators could emerge and engage. As the old Ethiopian saying goes, “a fence-sitter get shot with two bullets – from both sides”.
So much as politics is by default defined a non-principled endeavor, many shy away from active engagements. Unlike in Western democracies, it is hard to find people in each political party, who would work across the aisle to reach compromise and most importantly to avert a head-on partisan battle that harms the pillars of the state. These deficits in political culture and institutions, in turn, feed the ruling and opposition parties’ tendencies to focus on partisan interests.
Ethiopia can indeed alter this vicious circle. But the required tasks are not the type that grab headlines and or obtain applauds from some circles. Nor are they likely to bear fruit in months. This may not be an attractive engagement for those who are well-placed to take the initiative.
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