To Walk in a Low-Level Rent-Seeker’s Shoes

Since the inception of the term ‘rent seeking’ in Ethiopia, it has been exhaustively discussed in public service institutions. Nonetheless, rent seeking, under the guise of so many names at different times, has existed ever since the establishment of institutionalized services.

Struggles to alleviate the behaviour have also been part of the history of public institutions. There have been strategic approaches designed to mitigate the extent of the problem. However, the strategic struggles at structural levels seem to result in the involvement of leaders at the highest levels. That is why policy leaders like state ministers, were found victims, as witnessed last week. This shows that the nature of rent seeking behaviour does not have a structural boundary. It rather has a structural continuum.

There are many reasons why rent seeking is difficult to stop in civil service institutions. These reasons have their individually-independent explanations, as the misbehaviour is performed under some cover. This article endeavours to present the discussion from the grassroots level.

It is claimed that public service employees currently have a lower wage than those working in the private sector.

This claim stimulates a search for, not only its existence but also the extent of rent seeking. Existence and extent are, therefore, essential in the grand and grassroots level analysis of rent seeking.

At the highest levels, the resilient reasons for continued rent seeking are operational blunders and structural enigmas. Because, usually, misbehaviours are practised as ascribed by structural obstacles.

At the operation level, there are inescapable variables to scrutinize rent seeking. These variables include the workers’ exposure and extent of field work, attitude and application of professional work ethics, misappropriation and abuse of machinery, unscheduled operations, time misuse and, most importantly, the per diem (daily allowance) of the field worker.

Public servants usually go on field work for different tasks. In such missions, they are provided supplementary tools with a time table, specified technical activities, identified places and agents to work with, and a meagre allowance. This per diem is given to cover expenses of the worker in his or her stay at the field. At least, it is anticipated to cover three meals a day, one-night accommodation, certain medical treatments and non-luxury drinks.

However, all these aforementioned costs are high compared to the allowance. The per diem can hardly cover the cost for a nightly accommodation, let alone the whole range of costs that make up a field worker’s day. This fact obliges the field worker to search for survival alternatives, and reduces the number of days of stay at field, as is usually the easiest solution.

Hence, public servants enculture such a work behaviour to stay in their positions, against their work ethics. Experts sent for a month’s long field work, use up their per diem in the first week, and rush to complete their tasks in the possible shortest time.

Otherwise, they terminate the field work and travel back home. Not surprisingly, the field reports they will prepare will have fantasy mixed in with reality. This is a theoretical guarantee for the rent seeking continuum. It creates manifold losses to the public sector and the economy.

First, the tools taken to field work, such as vehicles or other machinery, stay idle for more than half of the time allotted for the field work. Because, once experts are back home with their field equipment, they are forced to hide; so that they would not be asked to refund the per diem. This wastes equipment that are expensive.

Second, experts are forced to develop unprofessional behaviour that gradually bears undesirable effects on their job and personality. Core values of public service and professional ethics will be diminished, eroding corporate trust, and leading to a level of rent seeking that will be very difficult to avert.

On the other hand, there are structural causes for the perpetuating rent seeking behaviour in public service institutes. This structural issue is the socioeconomic status (SES) of the public servant. As explained above, public servants are the least paid citizens in the country. This directly and absolutely, explains poorness; as income is the most determinant factor for SES. Meaning, they are predominantly poor, and are always on the hunt for money.

In fact, the majority of public servants do not own a house; which most likely, continues to be the fate of their children too, as poorness is inter-generational. So long as it is the human nature to desire improved life, the poor also have enormous material needs.

While living in conditions where basic needs are not met, it is unstoppable to covet luxury goods. Therefore, the public servant works under serious dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction, besides affecting productivity, will lead to rent seeking. But, the government does not have a developed economy to avail this majority and make a complete success of the situation.

Ultimately, the desire to have a better life and the importance of disposable incomes snowballs to create rent seeking. Rent seeking is, therefore, a continuum which exists as long as one of the two intertwined variables are not changed.

Breaking the continuum demands attention and investment by the government on the socioeconomic status of the public servant. Accordingly, citizens working in service sectors ought to be provided with good wages. The basic needs – food, shelter, cloth, and other demands – need to be met. When basic needs are satisfied workers will be on duty full time. When workers dedicate their time and energy to their jobs, services will be superb. When services are improved, jobs will become rewarding.


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