On November 13, 2014, Members of Parliament deliberated on a bill which aims to rewrite the Anti-Corruption Proclamation’s Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence. It is one of the two bills referred to the Law & Justice Standing Committee of the House. The other bill, the Proclamation to Provide for the Crimes of Corruption just passed the scrutiny of the Council of Ministers.
Should the administration be commended for its actions to continue to improve the legal tools and provisions in the national aspiration to advance a cause of just society? There should be little controversy.
The revised provisions to the current law aim to provide a coherent legal framework and offer to widen the scope of probing, yielding more power to the most feared Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC). The bill clarifies many provisions and includes new amendments giving the Commission cogent mandate for speedy investigations and information gathering. Ali Suleiman, the second Czar of the Commission since its founding in 2001, should be pleased with the extended power lawmakers have bestowed on him.
He will have, for instance, the power to give 48 hour restraining orders, pending the issuance of an order by a court. This is hoped to protect public resources before corrupt individuals squander them. Ideally, officials will have an opportunity to react quickly the moment they become aware of an act of corruption.
Traditionally, the Commission’s mandates include the promotion of ethics and anti-corruption education among members of the public.
But these are the softer sides of a federal agency which is also conferred to lead against corruption by investigating and prosecuting individuals and groups alleged to have breaches of trust in public offices, enterprises and organisations. The bill now tabled broadens its reach to include those involved with companies which raise funds from the public and enlist large numbers of shareholders.
Putting its mark in public consciousness, first under the stewardship of its founding Commissioner, Enwey G. Medhin, the Commission has had two politically charged high-profile round-ups, and subsequent prosecutions, over a span of a decade. Early on, no less than 54 senior state commercial bank employees, businessmen and women, and politicians, such as Seyee Abraha and members of his family, were its first victims.
It was this case which has damaged the Commission’s credibility in the eyes of the public. Its actions followed a division within the ruling party, which made many people perceive it as a political tool rather than a genuine public institution. Legislators did more harm than good to public perception when they amended a provision passed overnight and known since then as “Seyee’s Provision”; it deprived defendants of the right to bail before a final ruling is made by the courts. It essentially violated a suspects’ right to be presumed innocent before their guilt. It was amended a couple of years later. Parliament has again picked on this bill to table it in order to provide clarifications. If the corruption offence “charged” is believed to have a potential penalty of less than 10 years, defendants have the right to appeal for bail. Authors of the bill, however, appear to be keen to clear a confusion that this applies to “suspects” and is not limited to defendants.
The Commission’s records are thus a mixed bag. If its prosecutors fail to prove guilt in a court of law, this leads to the acquittal of many defendants after they have spent almost five years in jail. Indeed, the Commission has won verdicts in its favour on some of the cases, too.
Then came the second wave of round-ups last year, when Melaku Fenta, former director general of the Ethiopian Revenues & Customs Authority (ERCA), and his deputies as well as several prominent businessmen, were handcuffed after being accused of abuse of office and deeds of corruption. The former second in command of the security establishment, Woldesellasie Woldemichael, is among those who are currently fighting charges brought against them by the Commission for abuse of office to advance personal gains.
Whether the cases against Melaku et al. are politically motivated is a matter that depends on the evidence prosecutors from the Commission are able to unearth. Nonetheless, the jury is still out.
Cases such as this always put the credibility of the Commission to task. The fact is, corruption exists and impedes the country’s ability to be governed based on a rule of law. It depletes national resources and discourages people from working together towards shared values. It is one of the bottlenecks faced by developing countries, hindering public and private economic activities.
Ethiopia is no exception, in that incidents of corruption are on the rise. It is ranked 111th out of 177 countries on the 2013 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. On a scale of zero to 100, where zero represents highly corrupt, Ethiopia is scored at 33. Although much better than a good number of countries, this index is no reason for comfort.
Control of corruption, rule of law and regulatory quality are three of six indicators developed by the World Bank, where Ethiopia scored 30, 28.7 and 17 points, respectively, over the past five years. If its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is an insight into Ethiopia, it is indeed evident that the existence of established rule of law in a country, on its own, does little to translate to a regulatory quality. Despite, Ethiopia having made some positive progress in certain areas of the WGI, it also has regressed in certain indicators.
Except for those governments purposely built upon extractive institutions, any government accountable to its public would write proclamations outlawing the practice of corruption and abuse of public trust. All such governments ensure the existence of institutions that are trusted to enforce these laws.
Where the difference surfaces among countries is in their capability and political resolve to create institutions autonomous from whims of the powers that be, and to them do their work at their own discretion. Such is the system that grants enormous political capital of anti-corruption Czars to be effective tools for public education and awareness, as well as ability to prosecute. That is where the test lies.
Again, the EPRDFites are unable to pass with flying colours when it comes to their political resolve to fight corruption. Partly their limitation comes from their widely held views that the most crucial battle is in recreating Ethiopia’s society to be corruption averse and to despise such vices. They appear to believe that policing and hunting down culprits should not be where much of their energy and resources are expended.
These could be hard to challenge arguments, on the face of it. Indeed, forming an enlightened society, where citizens stand up to ascertain their rights and challenge those who bend the laws to advance partisan interests may not be Utopian. Nonetheless, it is a battle for the long-term with hard to measure results in the short term. Social transformation of this nature is rather the result of a combination of factors, including education, exposure and income level.
Yet none matches the creation of a political system where voters acknowledge that the administration of the day is accountable to its electorate, and could be fired from office upon failure. No doubt Ethiopia has a long way to go before its electorate feels that change is achievable via the voting card.
An emboldened public committed to fighting corruption will depend on whether such an accountable government takes swift and decisive measures to act against corrupt individuals, and especially in the case of corrupt public servants. That would greatly reflect the government’s determination to bring about meaningful change. The administration of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has yet to show its bold and sincere political commitment to curtail, control and reduce public corruption, without cutting itself short of some untouchables in its midst.
Lack of political resolve is also demonstrated in the administration’s failure to see the Commission act on its own, holding the powerful accountable to their misdeeds.
That the Commission is structured to be accountable to the Prime Minister can only cast suspicion on the degree of its autonomy to act free of a partisan agenda. Enabling the Commission to stand as a revered independent institution and strengthening the public’s faith remains an uphill task to those in the forefront of the anti-corruption battle. It is only by carrying out its duties boldly and transparently that the Commission can build the public’s trust.
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